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THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF GUILTY
PLEAS IN SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at section 1983 of
Title 28 of the United States Code (section 1983,1 creates a federal cause
of action for individuals deprived of constitutional rights by persons ac-
ting under color of state law.2 Many criminal defendants file section 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1I 1979).
Id. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. Congress enacted § 1983 as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, or Ku Klux Klan Act, Ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13 (1871), in response to the lawless conditions in the Reconstruction South. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961),
overruled 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
663 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape in part). Many areas of the South in the 1870s had
developed a two tier system of justice. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1871). White
Southerners had no difficulty pressing claims, but justice failed when a case involved blacks
or Union sympathizers. Id. Gangs lynched or attacked innocent people, sheriffs refused to
serve writs for blacks, and juries denied justice to blacks without fear of judicial redress. Id.
at 334, 374. Congress intended § 1983 to supply a federal cause of action to individuals
deprived of fourteenth amdndment rights by state officials acting under the authority of
state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 185-87; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 217.
The United States Supreme Court has found that § 1983 has three main goals. 365 U.S.
at 173. First, § 1983 can override certain state laws. Id. If a state legislature passes a statute
designed to deny certain groups their constitutional rights, an aggrieved party may file a §
1983 action to enjoin application of the statute. See id.; Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy
for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 838, 846-49 (1964). Second, § 1983
provides a remedy when state laws are inadequate. 365 U.S. at 173. If certain groups have
no remedy for legitimate grievances in state court because the state legislature failed to
enact a remedy, the group might find a remedy under federal law in a § 1983 action. See id.
at 173-74. The third goal of § 1983 is an attempt by Congress to remedy the most important
problem in the Reconstruction South. See id. at 174. Section 1983 provides a remedy when
the state remedy is adequate in theory but not in practice. Id. at 174-75. Consequently, if a
state provides a legal remedy for a particular grievance, but a party cannot utilize the
remedy because the sheriff will not deliver a writ, law enforcement officials ignore intimida-
tion of witnesses, or the courts allow juries to disregard legal standards, the afflicted party
may strike back with a § 1983 suit in federal court. See id. at 174-78. A successful § 1983
plaintiff can obtain injunctive relief and monetary damages against the defendants. See Mit-
chum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972); Note, Section 1983: A CivilRemedyfor the Pro-
tection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 838, 846-47 (1964).
Federal courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 suits by virtue of § 13433) of Title 28 of
the United States Code, which provides the federal district courts with original jurisdiction
"to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law .... of any right, privilege or im-
munity secured by the Constitution of the United States .... 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. III
1979). Section 1343(3) does not grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.
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actions in federal court during or upon completion of the state prosecu-
tion.' If the prosecution results in a conviction, the defendants in the sec-
tion 1983 suit may attempt to raise a collateral estoppel defense to pre-
vent relitigation of certain issues decided against the defendant in the
state prosecution.4 The United States Supreme Court recently legitimiz-
See id.; S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.12 (1979 & Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as NAHMOD]. State courts may thus exercise concurrent jurisdiction over §
1983 suits. See Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80,84,243 S.E. 2d 156,159, appeal dismissed,
295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E. 2d 12 (1978); NAHMOD, supra, § 1.12. Section 1343(3) does not require
that a plaintiff exhaust available state remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477
(1973); NAHMOD, supra, § 1.12. Consequently, a plaintiff may file a claim in either state or
federal court. See 411 U.S. at 477; NAHMOD, supra, § 1.12. Because plaintiffs filing § 1983
suits typically wish to attack the actions of state officials, the plaintiffs overwhelmingly
choose to file § 1983 claims in federal court to obtain a fairer trial. See NAHMOD, supra, §
1.12.
The seminal § 1983 case is Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the Court
thoroughly explored the legislative history of § 1983 and construed an action "under color of
state law" to be a misuse of power through the use of state law that is possible only because
the wrongdoer possesses the authority of state law. See id. at 184-87. Since Monroe, the im-
portance of § 1983 has grown as the Supreme Court has applied the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Ac-
tions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 192 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Averitt].
3 See Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Sec-
tion 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 95 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Estoppel];
see, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. New York, 497 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir.) (defendant convicted under
state law for distributing political pamphlets in Central Park without permit filed § 1983 ac-
tion asking federal court to declare state law unconstitutional), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1272 (3d Cir.) (after jury convicted defendant in
state court of burglary and larceny, defendant brought § 1983 action in federal court claim-
ing that prosecution used perjured testimony at trial), cert denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
' See Collateral Estoppel, supra note 3, at 95. Once a court of competent jurisdiction
has litigated and decided a certain issue, collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion," prevents
relitigation of the issue. See Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 281, 281 n.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Issue Preclusion]. Although the prerequisites
for collateral estoppel vary among jurisdictions, three requirements are fundamental. First,
the issue that one party wishes to preclude in the second suit must be identical to an issue
decided in the first suit. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 279 (8th Cir. 1979); Scooper
Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974); Nash v. Reedel, 86 F.R.D. 13,
15 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Second, the first proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment.
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d at 844; Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp.
1327, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Third, the party to be estopped must have been a party or privy
to a party in the first suit. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d at 279; Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F.
Supp. 833, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1979). An individual is privy to an action if he controls the suit
without becoming a party, allows a party to represent his interests, or is a successor in in-
terest to a party. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, Comment a, at 389 (1942).
In addition to these basic prerequisites, many courts list other requirements. See Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (collateral estoppel does not apply if party did not have
full and fair opportunity to litigate issue in first suit); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d
631, 637 (2d Cir. 1974) (to apply collateral estoppel to issue, such issue must have been
necessary to decision in first action), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Campise v. Hamilton,
382 F. Supp. 172, 183 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (collateral estoppel not applicable unless parties in
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ed the use of collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions in Allen v. Mc-
Curry. In McCurry, the Supreme Court held that in a section 1983 ac-
tion filed after the plaintiffs conviction by a jury in state court, a defend-
ant may assert collateral estoppel under the general limitation that the
doctrine will not apply if the state court did not allow the plaintiff a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the state prosecution.' The
first suit actually litigated issue in question), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 279 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977). The rule from the Restatement (Second of Judgments requires
for issue preclusion that the parties actually litigate the issue, that the court render a final
judgment on the issue, and that the issue be essential to the judgment. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). One commentator has criticized the
Restatement for being too narrow and preventing courts from applying collateral estoppel
to cases involving .waivers, guilty pleas, default judgments, and consent judgments. See
Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
464, 471-97 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Vestal]. Professor Vestal suggests that a better re-
quirement would allow a court to apply collateral estoppel if the party to be estopped had
incentive and opportunity to litigate in the first suit and if the issue was necessary to the
judgment. See id. at 496-97. If the party had incentive and opportunity to litigate a
necessary issue and failed to do so, the court in the second suit could interpret that failure
as an admission of the truthfulness of the opposing party's allegations or a waiver of the
right to contest the issue. Id. at 495. See also Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of
Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Hazard].
Issue preclusion is one branch of the doctrine of res judicata, the other branch of which
is claim preclusion. Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the
Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 859, 859-60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Theis]. Under claim
preclusion, a judgment in one suit bars another suit between the same parties on the same
cause of action. Id. at 859. The bar includes any issues that the parties raised or might have
raised in the prior action. Id.
Congress codified the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in § 1738 of Title
28 of the United States Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). Section 1738 provides that federal
courts must give the same preclusive effect to prior state judgments as would the courts of
that state. Id.; see Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1333-34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Collateral Estoppel, supra
note 3, at 96 n.9. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires all state courts
to honor the judgments of courts in other states. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Section 1738 is
a full faith and credit statute that applies to federal courts. See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lin-
coln Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941) (referring to predecessor of § 1738); 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1976); Developments, supra, at 1334 & n.13. Under § 1738, a federal court applying col-
lateral estoppel should look to the law in the state of the first adjudication to determine how
the courts in that state apply the doctrine. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
Federal courts applying collateral estoppel, however, often do not mention § 1738 and look
instead to the federal law of collateral estoppel. See Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 55 (2d
Cir. 1978); Torke, Res Judicata in Federal Civil Rights Actions Following State Litigation,
9 IND. L. REV. 543, 554-55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Torke]. Under § 1738, federal courts
should look instead to state law. Id. at 556-57.
5 449 U.S. 90 (1980); see text accompanying notes 22-36 infra.
' 449 U.S. at 101-04. McCurry marks the first time that the Supreme Court directly
decided that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to § 1983 actions. See id. at 96.
Before McCurry, most federal courts concluded that collateral estoppel would apply in §
1983 actions. See, e.g., Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978) (collateral
estoppel precluded § 1983 plaintiff from relitigating issues of unconstitutional arrest, prose-
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McCurry Court, however, did not reach the question of whether col-
lateral estoppel should apply in a section 1983 suit when the plaintiffs
state court conviction results from a plea of guilty rather than from a
cution, conviction, and detention); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1259-61 (1st Cir. 1974)
(since state court conviction necessarily decided issue of perjury by police officer, plaintiff
may not relitigate issue in § 1983 action), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Palma v. Powers,
295 F. Supp. 924, 933-36 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (plaintiff precluded by collateral estoppel from
relitigating in § 1983 action issues of illegal search and arrest and conspiracy to terminate
telephone service). Some courts, however, emphasize the special role of § 1983 as guarantor
of constitutional rights. See note 2 supra. These courts accordingly grant § 1983 suits either
a total or partial exemption from collateral estoppel application. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 243-45 (9th Cir. 1980) (collateral estoppel should not apply in § 1983
suits if plaintiff was criminal defendant who had no choice but to defend in state court); Ney
v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971) (collateral estoppel should not apply to §
1983 actions); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 89 (E.D. Va. 1973) (collateral estoppel may
apply in § 1983 suits as long as plaintiff has other access to federal forum). Many commen-
tators likewise suggest that courts limit the use of collateral estoppel in § 1983 suits. See,
e.g., Averitt, supra note 2, at 195-98 (collateral estoppel should not apply if plaintiff involun-
tarily litigated in state court, exhausted state remedies, and did not receive disposition of
case on adequate and independent state grounds); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State
Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610, 616-17 (1978) (courts should
allow § 1983 plaintiff review of procedural fairness if plaintiff litigated claim in state court,
exhausted state remedies, and later alleges denial of full and fair hearing in state court);
Developments, supra note 4, at 1338-43 (collateral estoppel should only apply to plaintiffs
who voluntarily litigated in state court); Collateral Estoppel, supra note 3, at 104-06 (col-
lateral estoppel should apply in § 1983 actions only if court protects plaintiffs right to
federal forum through establishment of discretionary evidentiary hearing akin to that allowed
in federal habeas corpus actions).
Opponents of unlimited collateral estoppel application in § 1983 suits argue that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is inconsistent with the policy underlying § 1983. See Averitt,
supra note 2, at 192. Congress enacted § 1983 to provide a federal forum for parties unable
to receive a fair consideration of their constitutional claims in state court. See note 2 supra
(legislative history). Some authorities argue that Congress intended § 1983 to guarantee to
each individual the right to a federal forum to adjudicate his claims of constitutional
deprivation. See Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1977);
Averitt, supra note 2, at 196. Unrestricted application of collateral estoppel would deny this
right to some § 1983 plaintiffs who have no alternate route to federal court. See 567 F.2d at
277. Some commentators disagree with the courts on the issue of whether state judges are
as capable and unbiased as federal judges in ruling on constitutional issues. Compare
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1121-28 (1977) (state judges less com-
petent and more susceptible to local influences than federal judges) and Collateral Estoppel,
supra note 3, at 98 (state judges become immersed in state law and therefore may not follow
recent federal and constitutional developments) with Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105
(1980) (state courts as competent as federal courts in deciding constitutional matters) and
Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (court refused to assume that state
courts do not observe criminal defendants' constitutional rights). In Ney v. California, the
Ninth Circuit feared that if a successful prosecution based upon information obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights could bar a civil rights action against the
violating officers, then the Civil Rights Act would often be a "dead letter." 439 F.2d 1285,
1288 (9th Cir. 1971). Individuals wary of collateral estoppel also fear a situation in which a
criminal defendant is faced with the Hobson's choice of raising his constitutional defense
during the state court trial and risking loss of the right to pursue the issue in federal court
or preserving his federal claim by saving the constitutional defense and risking a criminal
conviction. See Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973); Developments, supra
note 4, at 1340.
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jury verdict. Adjudication by guilty plea in a criminal prosecution
presents special problems for the application of collateral estoppel in a
subsequent section 1983 action because the parties do not put potential
section 1983 issues in contention for direct decision by the court.7
Because many courts require litigation of an issue during the prosecu-
tion before allowing collateral estoppel,' courts differ over which issues,
if any, a court may estop the parties from relitigating after a guilty plea.9
Although most courts before McCurry allowed a collateral estoppel
defense in section 1983 suits, some courts refused to allow the defense or
accepted it with special limitation. 10 For example, several courts premis-
ed their acceptance of collateral estoppel upon the availability of a
federal forum through a federal habeas corpus action." The Supreme
See Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at 292-93.
See Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 854-56 (1st Cir. 1978); Campise v.
Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172, 183 (S.D. Tex. 1974), appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 279 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977); note 4 supra. See also RESTATEMJENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
' Compare Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (collateral estoppel ap-
plies equally whether prior adjudication is by verdict or guilty plea) with Brown v. Scott,
462 F. Supp. 518, 519-20 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (because plaintiff entered guilty plea in state prose-
cution, parties did not litigate issue of statute's constitutionality, and collateral estoppel
does not apply), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 791 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
"o See, e.g., Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 467 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1977) (court
should deny use of collateral estoppel if plaintiff would thereby have no access to federal
forum); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971) (successful prosecution based
upon illegally obtained evidence should not preclude later § 1983 action against violator).
See also note 6 supra.
" See, e.g., Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1977)
(court may refuse to apply collateral estoppel in § 1983 action if inability to raise habeas cor-
pus claim would deny plaintiff federal forum) (dicta); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86,
88-89 (E.D. Va. 1973) (collateral estoppel may apply in § 1983 action if habeas corpus is
available to guarantee plaintiff federal forum).
Congress provided federal habeas corpus review for state prisoners in § 2254 of Title
28 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Under § 2254, any federal court must
hear a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a
state court conviction on the ground that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or federal law. See id. § 2254(a). A federal court may accept the application only if
the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and can show that his conviction violated
the Constitution or federal law. See id. § 2254(a) & (b).
Congress extended federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners to promote the goals
of Reconstruction in the post-Civil War South. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9, 417
(1963) (Congress extended habeas corpus relief to state prisoners in anticipation of Southern
resistence to Reconstruction legislation); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1871)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)). Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel
do not apply to habeas corpus actions. See 372 U.S. at 423. Some commentators argue that,
in view of the similar origins and goals of §§ 1983 and 2254, § 1983 also should be exempt
from preclusion doctrines. See Theis, supra note 4, at 872-73; Torke, supra note 4, at 566-67.
The courts, however, have declined to accept the analogy. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 104-05, 104 n.24 (1980) (habeas corpus not substitute for § 1983 because remedies have
different purposes and procedural rules); Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 937 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (habeas corpus and § 1983 not analogous because they serve different purposes). See
also Comment, The Collateral-Estoppel Effect to be Given State-Court Judgments in
Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1493-95 (1980) (habeas corpus
1982] 1495
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Court, however, significantly restricted the scope of federal habeas cor-
pus review in Stone v. Powell.'2 In Stone, a jury convicted the defendant
of second degree murder despite his claim that the prosecution obtained
evidence through a search and seizure that violated the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.'3 The defendant filed for a writ of habeas cor-
pus based on the same claim. 4 The Supreme Court held that if the state
prosecution provided the opportunity for a full and fair litigation of the
defendant's fourth amendment claim, the Constitution does not require
habeas corpus relief on the ground that the prosecution introduced il-
legally obtained evidence at the trial. 5 The Court reasoned that the ex-
clusionary rule'6 should not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings. 7 The Stone Court reasoned that the exclu-
sionary rule should apply only if the benefits of police deterrence and
judicial integrity outweigh the costs of excluding reliable evidence and
and § 1983 are separate remedies that do not impose equal costs on judicial system). The
court in Palma v. Powers noted that society has a special interest in protecting the in-
dividuars right to personal liberty, which justifies the habeas corpus exception to collateral
estoppel. See 295 F. Supp. at 937. The Palma court concluded that a § 1983 action for money
damages does not justify an equivalent exception. See id.; accord, Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980).
12 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
" Id. at 469-70. In a scuffle with a liquor store manager, Powell shot and killed the
manager's wife. Id. at 469. A police officer later arrested Powell for violating a vagrancy or-
dinance and discovered a revolver during a search incident to the arrest. Id. At trial, Powell
argued that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 470. Powell claimed
that the court should have excluded testimony regarding .the revolver because the officer
obtained the gun pursuant to an illegal arrest. Id. The trial court rejected Powell's conten-
tion and the state appellate court affirmed. Id.
" Id. The federal district court rejected Powell's claim that the vagrancy statute was
unconstitutional. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute was un-
constitutionally vague, making Powell's arrest illegal. Id. at 471. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the trial court should have excluded testimony regarding the revolver. Id.; see note 16
infra (exclusionary rule). The warden of the prison in which Powell was incarcerated peti-
tioned for Supreme Court review. 428 U.S. at 474.
15 428 U.S. at 481-82.
" The exclusionary rule is a judically created means of protecting an individual's"
fourth amendment rights. Id. at 482. See generally Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule provides that a
court may not allow the prosecution to introduce evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482-83. The Supreme Court first held the ex-
clusionary rule applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio. Id. at 483. See generally Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See 428 U.S. at 486. The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should
not extend to grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-55
(1974) (witness may not refuse to answer grand jury questions on ground that prosecution
based question on evidence prosecution obtained in illegal search and seizure). In addition,
the prosecution may use illegally seized evidence to impeach a defendant who testifies in his
own defense and whose testimony contains more than a mere denial of the charges against
him. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (exclusionary rule does not bar in-
troduction of evidence, for impeachment purposes, of heroin capsule illegally seized from de-
fendant after defendant testified that he had never possessed heroin).
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possibly freeing a guilty defendant."s The Court concluded that the costs
of habeas corpus review of search and seizure claims far outweigh the
benefits of the review and, thus, courts should not entertain exclu-
sionary rule claims during habeas corpus review. 9 Stone effectively
eliminated the habeas corpus remedy for prisoners with claims based on
the exclusionary rule." After the Stone decision, more courts called for
an exception to the application of collateral estoppel in section 1983 ac-
tions when a plaintiff had no other access to a federal forum."
Several years after Stone, the Eighth Circuit held in McCurry v.
Allen22 that a state court determination on the constitutionality of a
search and seizure would not preclude a section 1983 action because the
plaintiff had no federal habeas corpus remedy available after Stone v.
Powell.' After arresting McCurry at his home for possession of heroin
and assault with intent to kill, officers entered his home without a search
warrant to search for confederates.24 The officers seized drugs
discovered in plain view, as well as drugs found in dresser drawers and
in auto tires on the porch.' The trial judge admitted the drugs found in
plain view but suppressed the drugs found in drawers and tires.26 After
"' See 428 U.S. at 489. The primary purposes of the exclusionary rule are two-fold.
First, courts apply the rule to protect judicial integrity or to prevent the implication of
judicial complicity in violations of the fourth amendment. Id. at 484. Second, the exclu-
sionary rule is supposed to deter future fourth amendment violations by taking away the in-
centive for police officers to illegally secure incriminating evidence for use at trial. Id.; see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961).
" See 428 U.S. at 489-95. The Stone Court reasoned that the costs of applying the ex-
clusionary rule at trial and on direct appeal persist in habeas corpus review. Id. at 491.
These costs include diverting the focus of the trial from the question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence and excluding evidence that is normally reliable, thus disrupting the truthfind-
ing process. Id. at 489-91. On the other hand, the Court found that applying the exclusionary
rule on habeas corpus review adds only marginally to the benefit of reduced police incentive
to violate fourth amendment rights. Id. at 492-94.
The Stone Court stated that the exclusionary rule still should apply at the state trial
and appellate levels when the benefits of the rule arguably are greater than the costs. Id. at
493. The Court also stressed its confidence in the ability and willingness of state court
judges to uphold federal and constitutional interests. Id. at 493 n.35.
I See Note, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1060, 1062-63 (1980); The United States Supreme Court
Review, 8 Oto N.U.L. REV. 168, 171 (1981).
2 See Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1980) (court refused to apply
collateral estoppel to § 1983 plaintiff's claim of fourth amendment violation on ground that
Stone had eliminated possibility of habeas corpus review of claim); Rimmer v. Fayetteville
Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977) (collateral estoppel may apply to § 1983 actions
provided Stone does not operate to deprive defendant of federal forum) (dicta). See also
Comment, Collateral Estoppel in Section 1983 Action After Stone v. Powell: McCurry v.
Allen, 64 MINN. L. REv. 1060, 1066 (1980) (application of collateral estoppel to § 1983 plaintiff
who lacks recourse to habeas corpus after Stone violates special federal interest in pro-
viding federal forum for fourth amendment claims).
606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
n Id. at 799.
24 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 92 (1980).
SId.
Id. Under the plain view doctrine, objects in the plain view of police officers who are
legally present are subject to-seiur'e ly t-h-e-officers regardless of whether the officers have
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his conviction, McCurry filed a section 1983 suit against police officers
whom McCurry claimed illegally searched his home and assaulted him
after arrest." The section 1983 defendants moved for summary judg-
ment based on collateral estoppel, and the federal district court granted
the motion.28 McCurry appealed and the Eighth Circuit reversed.' The
Eighth Circuit stated that because the federal courts have a special role
in protecting civil rights, and because McCurry could not seek habeas
corpus relief under Stone, collateral estoppel should not preclude the
section 1983 claims.
3 0
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that criminal defendants
have a right to a federal forum"' and held that McCurry's inability to
gain habeas corpus review for his fourth amendment claims did not af-
fect the application of collateral estoppel to his section 1983 action.2 The
Court noted that if a state court gave the defendant a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate his federal claims, then the defendant had no absolute
right to relitigate the claims in federal court just because he considered
the lower court decision erroneous. The Supreme Court reiterated the
Stone Court view that state courts have an obligation to uphold federal
and constitutional law and are perfectly competent to do so.' While em-
phasizing that circumstances may justify exceptions to the use of col-
lateral estoppel, the Court recognized one general limitation to the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel in section 1983 suits subsequent to
criminal convictions. Collateral estoppel will not apply in a section 1983
action if the criminal defendant did not receive a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the state criminal prosecution. 6
In McCurry, the Supreme Court finally legitimized the application of
obtained a search warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (officer who
found robbery victim's auto registration card on floor of defendant's car curing impounding
procedure did not need search warrant).
McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
Id. at 797. The district court held that since legality of the search of the plaintiffs
home was the only issue in the § 1983 action, and the trial court decided the issue against
the plaintiff at his criminal trial, he was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue in
the § 1983 action. Id. The district court apparently ignored McCurry's allegation that police
officers assaulted him after his arrest. Id. The Eighth Circuit ordered the district court to
consider this claim upon remand. Id. The Supreme Court did not review this portion of the
circuit court's decision. See generally 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
See 606 F.2d at 797-99.
Id. at 799.
s' Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980).
Id. at 104-05.
See id. at 101. The Court found no congressional intent in § 1983 to guarantee a
criminal defendant a federal forum merely because he was not voluntarily in state court. Id.
at 104; cf. Averitt, supra note 2, at 196 (policy of granting all claimants one hearing in
federal court should bar collateral estoppel if § 1983 plaintiff involuntarily adjudicated in
state court); Developments, supra note 4, at 1342-43 (collateral estoppel should not preclude
federal relitigation if § 1983 plaintiff was involuntary defendant in state court).
449 U.S. at 105; see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).




collateral estoppel to section 1983 actions following criminal
convictions. 7 Because the state court in McCurry held a supression hear-
ing to decide all fourth amendment issues, the McCurry holding
necessarily is limited." Since the parties raised and adjudicated the
fourth amendment issues in state court, the Supreme Court did not have
to decide which issues the plaintiff could not relitigate.3 9 Had McCurry
pleaded guilty in state court and then claimed fourth amendment viola-
tions in a section 1983 action, however, the serious question exists
whether the Supreme Court would have extended collateral estoppel to
-" See id. at 97; note 6 supra. The McCurry opinion represents another of the Supreme
Court's expansive collateral estoppel decisions extending over a decade. In Emich Motors
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court stated that collateral estoppel principles
will prevent relitigation after a criminal conviction of all issues that the first court directly
put in issue and determined. 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 443 (1970); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 354 (1876). For years, the principle of
mutuality restricted collateral estoppel effects to the parties to the former suit and their
privies. See generally Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), overruled, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
Many courts then began to loosen the mutuality requirement and the Supreme Court even-
tually abandoned mutuality. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 350 (1971). The Supreme Court abandoned mutuality because the doctrine con-
tributed to overcrowded dockets, led to a poor allocation of judicial resources, and was not
imperative for fairness. See id. at 328-35. The Blonder-Tongue decision greatly expanded
the reach of collateral estoppel.
Recently, the Supreme Court has expanded collateral estoppel even further. In
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, plaintiff stockholders filed a class action suit against cor-
porate officers who were enjoined in a prior action from issuing misleading proxy
statements. 439 U.S. 322, 324 (1979). The plaintiffs claimed that collateral estoppel should
prevent the defendant officers from relitigating issues decided-against the defendants in the
prior action. Id. at 325. The Supreme Court agreed to the offensive use of collateral estoppel
as long as the practice is not unfair to the defendants. Id. at 331. The Court allowed the use
of collateral estoppel despite the fact that application deprived the defendants of a jury
trial. Id. at 333.
Collateral estoppel serves several policy goals, among the most important of which is
conservation of limited judicial resources burdened by an ever-increasing caseload. See
Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at 281; McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limita-
tions on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. R~v. 250, 302
(1974). Other goals include minimizing the possibility of inconsistent judgments, increasing
the finality of judgments, protecting litigants from the harassment and expense of multiple
lawsuits, and promoting comity among courts, especially between state and federal courts.
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,153-54 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491
n.31 (1976); Developments, supra note 4, at 1333; Collateral Estoppel, supra note 3, at 96.
The expansion of the collateral estoppel doctrine represents a desire to cut back the burden-
some caseload that currently is straining the federal court system. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. at 491 n.31 (effective utilization of judicial resources is important to federal court
system); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. at 328 (collateral
estoppel mutuality requirement worsens overcrowding of courts and leads to poor allocation
of judicial resources); Note, 8 OHIO N.L. REv. 168, 176-78 (1981) (Supreme Court more sen-
sitive to problem of excessive federal court workloads than to theoretical state court in-
competence).
1 449 U.S. at 92, 93 n.2. The McCurry Court emphasized that it was not deciding how
collateral estoppel should apply, id. at 105 n.25, nor whether collateral estoppel precludes
consideration of issues the plaintiff could have raised in state court, but did not. Id. at 97
n.10,
. See id. at 91.
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prevent litigation of the fourth amendment claims in a federal court.
When a defendant pleads guilty, the parties do not contest or litigate
all of the constitutional or factual issues relating to the crimes with
which the defendant is charged.0 Thus, a guilty plea does not satisfy the
actual litigation or direct decision requirements for collateral estoppel
that many courts mandate.4' To apply collateral estoppel in the guilty
plea situation, courts either must abandon the actual litigation re-
quirement42 or must construe a guilty plea as an implicit litigation of cer-
tain issues in the case.4" Another complicating factor is that many guilty
pleas result from a negotiated bargain." Plea bargaining raises the ques-
tion whether the defendant had the incentive to litigate, which often is
an important collateral estoppel prerequisite.45 In view of these prob-
lems, courts have espoused several general rules to give guilty pleas
some measure of collateral estoppel effect in any subsequent action.4"
The first rule that courts use to allow collateral estoppel after a guilty
plea states that a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea con-
clusively establishes in a subsequent civil action that the criminal defen-
dant engaged in the criminal act of which he was convicted." In Nathan
10 See Vestal, supra note 4, at 477.
41 See Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at 295; notes 4 & 8 supra.
42 See Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327, 1334-35 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Palma v. Powers,
295 F. Supp. 924, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In Palma, the court stated that collateral estoppel
usually applies only to issues that the parties actually raised in the first suit. See 295 F.
Supp. at 933. The Palma court then modified the litigation requirement to allow collateral
estoppel if the court finds a failure to litigate to be an admission of the truth of the oppon-
ent's claim. See id. at 936. In Hooper, the court ignored any litigation requirement and
allowed a collateral estoppel defense in a § 1983 action after the plaintiff pleaded, guilty to
criminal charges in state court. See 390 F. Supp. at 1334-35.
' See United States v. Globe Remodeling Co., 196 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D.Vt. 1961). In
Globe Remodeling, the court considered the parties to have put in issue and determined
each count to which the criminal defendant pleaded guilty in the criminal prosecution. See
id.; accord, Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1958). See also Vestal, supra
note 4, at 475-76. (Restatement (Second) of Judgments allows implicit litigation if court in
first suit does not expressly determine subject matter jurisdiction).
" See 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418, at 2706-08 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. Criminal defendants often plea bargain with prosecutors and will plead
guilty to one offense to avoid conviction for a more serious offense. Id. at 2706.
'" See Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at 294-96. If a criminal defendant pleads guilty
for reasons of expediency and convenience or to avoid a longer sentence, the defendant may
have no incentive to litigate the issues, and the court may be unable to treat the guilty plea
as an admission of the truthfulness of the charges. See Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924,
936 (N.D. Ill. 1969). But see Pouncey v. Ryan, 396 F. Supp. 126, 128 (D. Conn. 1975) (collateral
estoppel may apply after guilty plea even if party pleaded guilty only to avoid longer
sentence).
48 See text accompanying notes 47-83 infra.
4? See Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1977). The rule the Nathan
court applied is similar in result, if not in rationale, to the view that a guilty plea is ad-
missable in a civil suit only as evidence of an admission to the truth of the charges and that
the parties may supplement the admission with other evidence. See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1968) (guilty plea to manslaughter charge
is not conclusive of defendant's intent in subsequent garnishment proceeding; Dunham v.
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v. Tenna Corp.,48 a diversity action, the plaintiff sued to recover commis-
sions due under a contract that the defendant claimed was unenforceable
because of an illegal commissions-splitting scheme.49 The plaintiff had
pleaded guilty in a prior criminal case to mail fraud charges resulting
from the scheme." The plaintiff attempted to argue that other parties
coerced him into the illegal scheme, but the Seventh Circuit disallowed
the argument."' Following the general rule in the Seventh Circuit," the
Nathan court held that the guilty plea conclusively established that the
plaintiffs conduct was criminal.53 The Nathan rule is the narrowest of
the judicial preclusion rules regarding guilty pleas.
The second rule that courts have developed to give collateral estop-
pel effect to a guilty plea states that a guilty plea conclusively
establishes, in a subsequent civil suit all essential elements of the crime
charged.' Ivers v. United States55 illustrates this broader judicial ap-
plication of collateral estoppel to guilty plea cases. The plaintiff in Ivers
attempted to enter the United States without reporting to customs
Pannell, 263 F.2d 725, 728-30 (5th Cir. 1959) (in tort suit following auto accident, driver's plea
of guilty to speeding charge admissable for impeachment purposes); Book v. Datema, 256
Iowa 1330, -, 131 N.W.2d 470, 471 (1964) (driver's guilty plea to criminal charges
resulting from auto accident is admissable as admission against interest in subsequent
wrongful death action against driver); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133, Com-
ment b (Tent. Draft No. 7 1980); Vestal, supra note 4, at 478.
560 F.2d 761 (7th Cr. 1977).
"Id. at 762. Under the contract, defendant Tenna Corporation (Tenna) agreed to pay
the plaintiff a commission for all orders Tenna received from a third party. Id. The plaintiff,
however, established an illegal commissions-splitting agreement with the buying agent for
the third party. Id.
0Id.
s' Id. at 763. The plaintiff claimed that the buying agent threatened to cut off the plain-
tiffs business with the third party unless the plaintiff agreed to split his commissions with
the buying agent. Id.
Id. at 763-64. The Nathan court, following § 1738 of Title 28 of the United States
Code, looked to Illinois state law to determine the collateral estoppel effect of the guilty
plea. Id. at 763; see note 4 supra (discussion of § 1738). The Illinois rule states that a court
determines the collateral estoppel effect of judgments rendered in other jurisdictions by the
law in the jurisdiction rendering judgment. 560 F.2d at 763. The court thus applied Seventh
Circuit law because the plaintiff was convicted in a Seienth Circuit federal district court.
Id.
13 560 F.2d at 763-64; accord, United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D.N.J.),
affd, 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952 (1954). The Nathan court concluded
that no material issue existed whether the plaintiff had engaged in illegal conduct. 560 F.2d
at 763-64.
See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21 (8th Cir. 1975) (court hearing
appeal after defendant pleaded guilty to illegal entry into United States held that, by guilty
plea, defendant admitted all essential elements of offense charged), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1057 (1976); Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (in,§ 1983 action, court held
that, by pleading guilty in state prosecution to charge of selling heroin, plaintiff necessarily
waived entrapment claim); United States v. Levinson, 369 F. Supp. 575, 578 (E.D. Mich.
1973) (defendant's guilty plea in prosecution for fraud established all essential elements of
charge in subsequent suit by government to recover embezzled money under False Claims
Act).
. 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978).
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agents that he was carrying $40,000 in cash .5 After pleading guilty to a
cash-reporting violation and to entering the United States after a former
deportation, the plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court to recover the
cash." The Ninth Circuit ruled that a plea of guilty is an admission of
every essential element of the crime charged, including state of mind.'
The plaintiff, therefore, could not deny that he entered the country
while wilfully failing to report the money. 9 A federal district court in
Pennsylvania has applied the Ivers rule in a section 1983 action. In
Mayberry v. Somner,0 the plaintiff had pleaded guilty to several charges
stemming from the plaintiffs attempted escape from custody while
guards transported him to prison." Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a
section 1983 action against prison guards whom the plaintiff claimed had
fabricated the escape attempt in order to kill the plaintiff.2 The district
court noted a "majority rule" that a conviction based upon a guilty plea
is conclusive in a subsequent civil suit between the same parties regard-
Id. at 1364. Anyone entering the United States must report on a customs form the
amount of cash over $5,000 he is carrying. See 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
581 F.2d at 1365. The United States seized all cash the plaintiff was carrying when
entering the country and informed the plaintiff that he could petition for relief from
forfeiture of the money. Id. The Customs Service denied the plaintiff's petition and the
plaintiff filed suit in federal court. Id. at 1366. The plaintiff claimed that he did not violate
the cash-reporting statute wilfully because he was ignorant of the reporting requirement.
Id.
, Id. at 1366-67. See also United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826, 829-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (defendant's guilty plea to charge of bribing government employee establish-
ed essential parts of bribery charge in subsequent government suit to recover damages
under Surplus Property Act); United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907,
909-10 (D.N.J. 1955) (although plea of guilty to conspiracy charge established essential
elements of conspiracy in subsequent government suit for damages under False Claims Act,
alleged overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy were not essential elements of crime of con-
spiracy); Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68, 75 (1964) (defendant's guilty plea
to charge of income tax evasion established fraudulence of tax return in question in subse-
quent government suit to obtain back taxes). In addition to holding that a guilty plea
established the essential elements of the charged offenses for the purposes of a subsequent
civil suit, each of these courts stated that giving collateral estoppel effect to a conviction by
guilty plea is more appropriate than giving similar effect to a conviction by jury verdict.
See United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. at 829; United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons
Co., 127 F. Supp. at 909-10; Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. at 75. The courts
reasoned that a defendant who pleads guilty admits the truthfulness of the charges, which
gives greater reason to estop the defendant from denying the same charges in a subsequent
suit than if the defendant had denied the charges from the beginning. See 139 F. Supp. at
829; 127 F. Supp. at 909-10; 43 T.C. at 75.
" Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1978).
' 480 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
" Id. at 835. Plaintiff Mayberry pleaded guilty to charges of attempted murder,
assault, possessing instruments of a crime, and attempted escape. Id.
" Id. Mayberry claimed that the guards drove him to an isolated spot and attempted
to shoot him. Id. Mayberry further claimed that in self-defense he pushed the gun aside,
causing the shots to hit one of the guards in the head. Id. Finally, according to Mayberry,




ing all issues that a contested trial would have determined. 3 The
Mayberry court then held that a guilty plea admitted the essential
elements of the crime charged.64 The guilty plea thus precluded the
plaintiff from arguing different facts than the guilty plea itself
established. 5
The "essential elements" rule is sound logically. A conviction from a
guilty plea is a valid final judgment,66 as is a jury conviction. To obtain a
jury conviction, the parties must litigate the essential elements of the
crime. A court applying the essential elements standard, therefore, is
willing to assume an implicit litigation of those essential elements. One
variation in the rationale of the essential elements test is that a court
defines "directly determined" as not requiring "actual" litigation, thus
allowing court acceptance of the guilty plea as a direct determination of
the essential elements of the offense.' As another rationale for the
essential elements standard, a *court rejects the "actual" litigation re-
quirement in favor of an "incentive to litigate" requirement. The court
then assumes that the plaintiff had a strong incentive to litigate the
essential elements of the crime involved, which assures that the plaintiff
made no frivolous admissions through his guilty plea.6 8 One advantage of
the essential elements standard is the flexibility it leaves courts to
decide equitably in each set of circumstances whether 'a particular ele-
ment is or is not an essential element of the crime charged. 9 This
freedom, however, may lead to inconsistent decisions if courts determine
which issues are essential elements of a crime on the basis of the out-
come a court prefers in a particular case.
The broadest judicial rule for the application of collateral estoppel
Id. at 838 (quoting 1B MOORE, supra note 44, 0.418, at 2706).
See 480 F. Supp. at 839; Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the
Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 170 (1965).
1 480 F. Supp. at 839-40. The Mayberry court stated that a court must have a suffi-
cient factual basis before accepting a guilty plea. Id. The facts that the prosecution alleged
were, therefore, an essential part of the crimes charged, and collateral estoppel precluded
the plaintiff from alleging different facts. Id.
, Bradford v. Lefkowitz, 240 F. Supp. 969, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"See United States v. Globe Remodeling Co., 196 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D. Vt. 1961) (guilty
plea directly put in issue and directly determined essential elements of offense); Vestal,
supra note 4, at 479 n.61 (some courts use "directly determined" as not requiring "actual
litigation").
" See Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at 295-96. Under an incentive to litigate require-
ment for collateral estoppel, preclusion will not apply to any issue, whether litigated or not,
unless the party had an incentive to litigate. Id. at 288-89. If the party has incentive to
litigate and fails to do so, the failure to litigate is an admission of the truthfulness of the
charge. Id. at 295-96.
" Each case rests upon a unique set of facts. Although a crime always will consist of
certain essential elements, other individual facts or statutory elements may become essen-
tial depending upon the facts of a given case. The essential elements rule allows courts
freedom to decide when a particular element or fact is or is not essential to conviction and,
thus, when collateral estoppel will preclude relitigation of such element or fact in the second
suit.
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states that a guilty plea is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional claims and
that collateral estoppel therefore precludes all but jurisdictional attacks
in subsequent suits between the parties." In Bradford v. Lefkowitz,71 the
plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against the Attorney General of
New York. 2 The plaintiff claimed that the prosecution fraudulently had
invoked the plaintiffs guilty plea to charges of violating state securities
provisions." After noting that a guilty plea has the same effect in law as
a jury verdict, the court held that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all
nonjurisdictional defenses. 4 The Bradford court held that since the
plaintiff waived nonjurisdictional defenses, collateral estoppel blocked
his illegal detention claim.' In Hooper v. Guthrie," a federal district
court in Pennsylvania showed more clearly the extent to which courts
are willing to extend the waiver standard. After pleading guilty to
charges of passing worthless checks and of false pretenses, the plaintiff
brought a section 1983 action claiming a search in violation of the fourth
amendment.77 The court noted that a guilty plea is an admission by which
the criminal defendant waives all claim of nonjurisdictional defects in
the case. 8 The Hooper court, therefore, held that collateral estoppel
prevented the plaintiff from raising the illegal search claim in federal
court since he gave up his opportunity to contest the issue at trial.79
" See Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313, 317 (10th Cir. 1971) (criminal
defendant who pleaded guilty to possession of heroin could not subsequently attack validity
of search warrant in § 1983 action because guilty plea waives all but jurisdictional questions
in later action); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir.) (guilty plea is waiver of all
nonjurisdictional issues and rule does not depend on whether party raises issue on appeal or
on collateral attack or whether parties raised issue in advance of original trial), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 843 (1965).
71 240 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
72 Id. at 971.
71 Id. at 972. The plaintiff claimed that the prosecution had promised to dismiss some
charges against the plaintiff and ask for a lenient sentence for other charges if the plaintiff
pleaded guilty to reduced charges. Id. The plaintiff also claimed, without being specific, that
the promises were false. Id.
", Id. at 975; accord, United States v. Ptomey, 366 F.2d 759, 760 (3d Cir. 1966) (court
denied defendant opportunity on appeal to withdraw guilty plea to bank robbery charge
because guilty plea waived all nonjurisdictional defects).
11 See 240 F. Supp. at 975. The Bradford court noted that illegal detention is a non-
jurisdictional defect. Id.
390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 1329. Police searched the plaintiff and his apartment pursuant to his arrest. Id.
at 1328. The Hooper trial court held no pretrial hearing to determine the legality of the
search. Id. at 1329.
7 Id. at 1335. The Hooper court quoted the general rule that a conviction based upon a
guilty plea precludes in a subsequent suit all issues that a conviction after a contested trial
would determine. Id. at 1334 (quoting 1B MOORE, supra note 44, 0.418, at 2706). The
Hooper court then held that an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdic-
tional defects and is a conclusive admission that all charges in the indictment are true. 390
F. Supp. at 1335. The Hooper court gave the majority rule noted in Moore a broader inter-
pretation than did the Mayberry court. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
71 390 F. Supp. at 1335.
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The broad waiver standard presents a harsh prospect for criminal
defendants who plead guilty and then wish to file a related civil claim.
The rule does not consider incentive to litigate or the expediency or com-
promise involved in a bargained guilty plea, which other authorities con-
sider important in determining whether collateral estoppel should
apply." The waiver rule ignores the actual litigation and incentive to
litigate requirements for collateral estoppel application as well as the re-
quirement that an issue be a necessary element for the judgment before
collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation.1' Most courts utilize one or
more of these three requirements in determining whether to apply col-
lateral estoppel because these requirements guard against unjust or in-
advertent preclusion of meritorious issues." Although the waiver rule
does afford an opportunity to litigate, if the criminal defendant has no in-
centive to litigate, the opportunity may not be a fair opportunity.3
Courts may question whether a defendant who pleads guilty always in-
tends to waive all rights to litigate a fourth amendment claim, such as an
illegal search. A defendant may plead guilty to a lesser offense, fully in-
tending to pursue the fourth amendment violation in a subsequent
federal court suit.
84
See 1B MOORE, supra note 44, 0.418, at 2706; Issue Preclusion, supra note 4, at
294-96. But see Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1972) (evidence of plea
bargain does not lessen preclusive effect of guilty plea); Pouncey v. Ryan, 396 F. Supp. 126,
128 (D. Conn. 1975) (evidence that defendant pleaded guilty to avoid long sentence does not
affect collateral estoppel after plea).
" See note 4 supra (requirements of collateral estoppel).
2 See A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATAIPRECLUSION V-196-205 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PRECLUSION]; note 4 supra. If a safeguard such as actual litigation or incentive to litigate
does not define the limits of collateral estoppel, courts could preclude issues that the defend-
ant did not consider in the first suit or that the defendant did not attempt to prepare or
litigate adequately. PRECLUSION, supra, at V-196-205. In addition, the deciding court may not
have evaluated carefully issues not essential to the judgment. Id. at V-204.Preclusion in
such circumstances is not equitable.
" See PRECLUSION, supra note 82, at V-196-205.
" A state may charge the defendant with a felony following an illegal search. The prose-
cutor offers to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor in exchange for a guilty plea. The de-
fendant, knowing that the prosecutor has incriminating evidence independent of the illegal
search, agrees and pleads guilty to the misdemeanor. The defendant still intends to file a §
1983 action against the police officers regarding the search. The defendant certainly did not
intend to waive his illegal search claim, but to litigate the claim in state court and reject the
plea bargain would have been foolish. Nevertheless, the waiver rule would treat the guilty
plea as a waiver of the illegal search claim and collaterally estop the defendant from raising
the claim in a § 1983 action.
The Sixth Circuit, in Mulligan v. Schlachter, observed that an individual arrested
without probable cause may not use the fourth amendment violation to attack his prosecu-
tion unless the arresting officers seized evidence. 389 F.2d 231, 232 (6th Cir. 1968). Whether
the defendant contested his arrest at trial or pleaded guilty, his only opportunity for re-
dress for the illegal arrest would be a subsequent civil action against the offenders. Id. The
Mulligan court pointed out that the mere fact of an unreversed conviction does not mean
that the trial court examined the issue fully or that the defendant waived his right to
recompense. Id. at 233. Similarly, one commentator has suggested that a guilty plea should
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At the time of the Supreme Court's McCurry decision, the federal
courts espoused inconsistent rules for the application of collateral estop-
pel to fourth amendment claims in section 1983 actions following guilty
pleas. Under the essential element standard, a court normally would not
preclude fourth amendment claims unless the court decided under the
circumstances that the fourth amendment claim was an essential ele-
ment of the crime charged." Under the waiver standard, on the other
hand, a court normally would preclude any fourth amendment claim that
the defendant could have raised as a defense to or defect in the prosecu-
tion." Consequently, the question arises whether McCurry gives the
lower federal courts any guidance regarding the proper disposition of a
fourth amendment claim after a guilty plea. Two recent federal decisions
indicate the effects that the courts perceive in this area.
In Prosise v. Haring," the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action
against several police officers, claiming that the officers illegally searched
the plaintiffs home and seized drugs found there. 8 In a state court
criminal proceeding, the plaintiff had pleaded guilty to a charge of
manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP).9 The defendants in the section 1983
suit moved for summary judgment on the basis that the guilty plea in
the criminal case precluded any recovery in the civil action.90 The federal
district court granted summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.' The Fourth Circuit reviewed the McCurry decision,
but found that McCurry was not dispositive in determining the collateral
estoppel effect of a guilty plea on a fourth amendment claim because Mc-
Curry did not decide the guilty plea issue. The Prosise court noted that
the McCurry court emphasized looking to state law to determine how
the forum state would apply the estoppel doctrine.9 Under Virginia law,
which still requires mutuality, criminal judgments have no preclusive ef-
allow a presumption of the preclusion of essential issues subject to the defendant's right to
give a good reason why the plea was not a waiver of his right to contest the issue. See Issue
Preclusion, supra note 4, at 331-32.
See text accompanying notes 54-69 supra.
See text accompanying notes 70-84 supra.
667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1135. The defendant police officers answered a call about a domestic disturb-
ance at the plaintiff Prosise's home. Id. at 1134. After two gunshots sounded, Prosise
answered the door armed with two handguns. Id. at 1135. Prosise refused to drop the
weapons, and the officers disarmed him by force. Id. Prosise's companion then showed the
officers bags allegedly containing the drug phencyclidine and equipment for manufacturing
the drug. Id. The officers called a narcotics detective who obtained a search warrant. Id.
The officers then seized chemicals and drug paraphernalia. Id.
89 Id. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Id.
9 Id.
" Id. The plaintiff also had claimed excessive force in the arrest. Id. The district court
granted summary judgment on the basis of sworn statements by the defendants. Id. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court on this count. Id. at 1136.
" Id. at 1137-38.
13 Id. at 1138; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
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feet in subsequent litigation.94 The Virginia courts, however, have yet to
address the precise question that Prosise presents, so the court had to
proceed beyond the boundaries of Virginia law.9" The Prosise court held
that collateral estoppel should not apply to unlitigated fourth amend-
ment evidentiary questions29 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, unlike
essential element issues, fourth amendment issues may not give the
defendant sufficient incentive to litigate fully.97 A criminal defendant
may lack the incentive to litigate a fourth amendment issue because the
state has adequate evidence of guilt from untainted sources.9" The Pro-
sise court applied a general rule of nonpreclusion because the court felt
that a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the criminal defen-
dant had incentive to litigate fourth amendment issues would not be
worth the trouble.99
In Ford v. Burke,110 the federal District Court for the Northern
District of New York addressed a case similar to Prosise. After pleading
guilty to a robbery charge, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action
claiming illegal arrest in violation of the fourth amendment."' While
discussing McCurry, the district court noted that the Supreme Court's
failure to articulate which factors besides "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" might preclude collateral estoppel in a particular case has con-
fused the lower courts."0 2 The court stated that a case-by-case approach,
in which a court looks for factors that would prevent collateral estoppel
from precluding litigation, is better than an absolute rule requiring the
parties to litigate before allowing collateral estoppel."3 The court
reasoned that the circumstances of each case are too varied for an effec-
tive rule and that McCurry does not require actual litigation for issue
9' 667 F.2d at 1138-39. See also note 37 supra. See generally Board of Supervisors v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 119 Va. 763, 91 S.E. 124 (1916).





529 F. Supp. 373 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
101 Id. at 375. After the Ford plaintiff pleaded guilty to the robbery charge, he attacked
the plea in a habeas corpus proceeding in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. The federal district court found no constitutional rights violations and upheld the guilty
plea. Id. The plaintiff then filed the § 1983 suit. Id.
02 Id. at 377-78. Since McCurry, several courts have held that "full and fair opportunity
to litigate" means that collateral estoppel only applies to issues that the parties actually
litigated. See Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 1981); Carpenter v. Dizio,
506 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also text accompanying note 33 supra.
"0 529 F. Supp. at 378-79; see Cerbone v. County of Westchester, 508 F. Supp. 780, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Cerbone, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action claiming illegal arrest, trial,
and conviction on burglary and larceny charges. 508 F. Supp. at 782. The Cerbone court
noted that one factor that would cause a court to deny a collateral estoppel defense is inade-
quacy of counsel. Id. at 785. The Cerbone court, however, found no factual support for the
plaintiffs claims and stated that mere allegations will not call into question the plaintiffs
past opportunity for a full and fair litigation. Id. at 785-86.
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preclusion." 4 The Ford court found no factors present to prevent applica-
tion of collateral estoppel and indicated that the plaintiffs numerous ap-
peals in state and federal courts would ensure that the plaintiff would
suffer no prejudice from application of collateral estoppel."0 '
In Prosise, the Fourth Circuit held McCurry inapposite in guilty plea
situations and established a blanket rule of nonpreclusion for fourth
amendment claims following guilty pleas. 6 In Ford, the District Court
for the Northern District of New York read McCurry as indicating the
use of a case-by-case factor analysis in a guilty plea situation."7 Both
cases implicitly accept an essential element standard as a basis for
preclusion after guilty pleas but then derive different standards to handle
the nonessential fourth amendment issues."8
Both Prosise and Ford represent a step forward to the extent that
they implicitly reject the broad waiver standard that would preclude
almost all fourth amendment section 1983 actions. 9 The Prosise court's
absolute rule, however, may be nearly as harmful as the waiver stand-
ard. The Prosise rule disallowing collateral estoppel would allow courts
no flexibility, even when the facts of a case show the criminal
defendant's intent to waive his fourth amendment defense. If the fourth
amendment issue was to be the crucial issue at trial and the parties
necessarily would have adjudicated the issue had the defendant not
pleaded guilty, the Prosise rule still would not preclude relitigation.
Unlike the Ford court, the Prosise court refused to look to McCurry for
any indications of Supreme Court collateral estoppel policy beyond the
limited McCurry holding. The Prosise court's absolute rule against
preclusion is a move counter to the Supreme Court's policy of expanding
collateral estoppel application and diminishing the availability of fourth
amendment claims."0
A more reasonable and equitable solution is the case-by-case factor
approach that the Ford court adopted."' The Ford rule allows a court to
104 529 F. Supp. at 378-79.
"' Id. at 379-80.
" See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
107 See text accompanying notes 103-05 supra.
1" See Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d at 1140-41; Ford v. Burke, 529 F. Supp. at 377-79;
text accompanying notes 54-69 supra (essential element rule).
"' The Prosise rule barring collateral estoppel for fourth amendment issues after guilty
pleas is the opposite of the waiver rule that broadly allows collateral estoppel under the
same circumstances. See 667 F.2d at 1141-42; text accompanying notes 70-84 supra. The
Ford rule implicitly rejects the waiver standard because the Ford rule allows a court to look
at each case to see whether certain factors might forestall collateral estoppel application.
See 529 F. Supp. at 377-79; text accompanying notes 103-05 supra.
11 See note 4 supra.
.. See Ford v. Burke, 529 F. Supp. at 378-79. The case of Palma v. Powers espouses a
rule similar to the Ford rule. 295 F. Supp. 924, 934-36 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In Palma, the plaintiffs
brought a § 1983 action against police officers and the telephone company for conspiring to
terminate the plaintiffs' telephone service and for illegal search and arrest. Id. at 928-29.
Police officers, suspecting a gambling operation centered at the plaintiffs' retail auto parts
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consider the facts of each case and decide whether the criminal defend-
ant's guilty plea allowed the defendant a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his fourth amendment claim. Under the Ford rule, a court would
be free to look for any factor that may have denied the defendant a full
and fair opportunity to litigate. This approach satisfies both the col-
lateral estoppel policy of conserving judicial resources and the section
1983 policy of assuring equitable treatment of defendants in state prosecu-
tions."'
MELVIN T. RATTRAY
store, had obtained search warrants, raided the store, and arrested the plaintiffs. Id. at 929.
The telephone company disconnected the plaintiffs' telephones because of the illegal activity.
Id. The Palma court first ruled that the plaintiffs had raised and adjudicated the telephone
service issue at the state criminal prosecution, so collateral estoppel barred relitigation of
these issues in the § 1983 suit. Id. at 934. The plaintiffs did not challenge the legality of the
search during the trial and the trial court admitted evidence seized during the search. Id. at
934-35. The question, then, was whether collateral estoppel could apply to an issue that the
parties did not contest in the criminal prosecution. See id. at 935. The Palma court noted
that, although collateral estoppel usually applies only to issues actually litigated in the first
suit, courts do recognize exceptions for default judgments, consent decrees, and guilty
pleas. Id. From these exceptions the court distilled a general principle that preclusion is ap-
propriate in cases in which a court believes that a party's failure to contest an issue at trial
was a recognition of the validity of the opposing claim. See id. at 936. The court hearing the
§ 1983 claim should look at objective factors, such as the importance of the issue to the party,
the cost of litigating the issue, and the possibility of presenting a reasonable defense. Id.
Preclusion should not apply when expediency and convenience, rather than the merits, dic-
tate a party's trial technique. Id. According to the Palma court, a court would preclude an
issue only if the court considers the party's actions to be a waiver of the right to contest the
issue. See id. The Palma court added, however, that the party who once bypassed an oppor-
tunity to litigate an issue, and who in a later suit opposes collateral estoppel, has the burden
of explaining why he did not contest an issue necessarily decided in the first suit and why he
wants to contest the issue in the second suit. Id. Looking to the instant case, the Palma
court found that the plaintiffs' reasons for not litigating the legality of the search at the trial
were superficial and not supported by fact. See id. at 936-37. The court concluded that the
plaintiffs admitted the legality of the search by their failure to contest the issue at trial and
that collateral estoppel, therefore, should preclude litigation. Id. at 937; accord, Cramer v.
Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981) (§ 1983 plaintiff who did not contest legality of
search at trial waived any challenge to constitutionality of search).
I See notes 2 & 37 supra.
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